The NHL free agency period will open on July 1, and NHL teams will be tempted to sign blue-chip free agents who become available. The allure of acquiring top-tier talent through a big-money contract can be irresistible, and while the Kraken’s options might be limited this offseason, they will still need to weigh the risks and future contributions of signing one of these top available players. The critical question remains: is spending a substantial portion of the salary cap on one superstar truly worth it?
In this post, we will delve into the intricacies of high-value contracts in NHL free agency, examining the criteria that define such deals, evaluating the pre- and post-signing performance of marquee players, and analyzing whether these investments typically yield the desired returns.
Definition for “spending big” on a blue-chip free agent
To evaluate the performance of blue-chip free agents, we need to define and isolate players who signed big contracts in free agency. For this exercise, we are going to exclude restricted free agents and contract extensions. Because the salary cap upper limit changes from year to year, we are focusing on any contracts that account for over eight percent of a team’s salary cap for the following season. Eight percent is somewhat arbitrary, but we need to cut it off somewhere, and when evaluating the details, this seemed about right.
Contract term length is a very important aspect of evaluating the risk, value, and success of a contract, but to keep it simple, we are excluding it from our analysis.
The blue-chip cohort
Since 2011, there have been 40 contracts signed for 8 percent or more of the subsequent season’s upper limit of the salary cap. The position breakdown is 26 forwards, 12 defensemen, and two goalies. With only two goalies in the sample, we are going to exclude them from the analysis. The two goalies were Ryan Miller ($6M/year in 2015) and Sergei Bobrovsky ($10M/year in 2020).
Pre- and post-contract signing
Evaluating player performance goes well beyond goals and assists, but the big-ticket free agents, particularly the forwards, tend to be the highest scorers. For the sake of simplicity, we are just going to look at points and goals by position over a three-year period before and after the contract is signed.
Forwards
Here is a look at the 26 forwards who signed big free-agency deals and their average points per game in the three years prior to and after signing the contract.
As the chart shows, there is a drop of 12 percent in the first and second seasons, and a drop of 24 percent in the third season after signing the contract. We see a similar drop when looking at average goals per game.
We are starting to see a theme, but surely some of these contracts work out, don’t they? Here is a breakout of the details by player.
Yikes. Only three of the 26 contracts signed by forwards saw an increase in points per game in the three years after the contract was signed.
Defensemen
Now let’s turn our attention to the defense. Here is a look at the points per game of the 12 defensemen who signed big free-agency deals since 2011.
Interestingly, there is an increase in production in the second and third seasons after signing the contract. My theory is that a defenseman jumping to a new team will play more conservatively in the first year with that new team as he learns to play in a different system with new teammates. In seasons two and three, he starts to get more comfortable, and the coach might also give him more responsibility and playing time.
Regardless of the reason for the increase in years two and three, defensemen still see declines in the three years after signing their free agent contract.
Note: Because defensive goal scoring is more rare, we won’t be looking at the goals-per-game comparison.
Evaluation considerations
Depending on the expectations of the team signing the big-ticket player, going after the top free agents on the market can be a decision with diminishing returns. The simple analysis only evaluates the three years after signing, but most big free-agent signings end up being for longer terms of six or seven years. The average term length of the signings I looked at was 5.6 years. It is probably stating the obvious, but the data doesn’t look any better if I widen the period of analysis.
As mentioned above, points and goals per game are not the only metrics to consider when evaluating the impact of a free-agent signing. It should also be noted that any time a player changes teams, there is an adjustment period of adapting to new teammates and coaching styles that might result in a slight drop in production.
As challenging as the outlook might be for signing big free agents, many of the signings still add something to their new team that was probably missing from their roster. For example, the Kraken need to add goals to their lineup. In a scenario where the Kraken sign Sam Reinhart this offseason, even if he sees a drop of 20 percent in goal production over the prior three seasons, that still adds 32 goals to the roster.
What are your thoughts? Should the Kraken throw caution to the wind and go for one of the big free agents that will hit the market this offseason?
Interesting read. How much of the forward drop can be attributed to signing contracts with teams that have cap space but not necessarily the support they had on the team they were previously on? I think that would cover most of the forwards. Panarin makes sense that his numbers go up since he moved to a more developed team.
Personally I’m not in for swinging for the fences on UFA’s mainly because of what you outline above. I just don’t see them performing at the same level once they move.
That is definitely something I thought about but a challenge to quantify. I would also think Panarin’s first few years with the Rangers were at low point in the franchise. Regardless, he seems to be the exception to the rule.
Great article, I think any signing of a top tier free agent is going to be overpayment and nothing more than ownership wanting to sell tickets. Build for another few seasons and if we’re set up for a potential run then maybe it’s a different story.
thanks. I am of the same opinion.
I kinda agree with Nino’s sentiment, but I wonder if the powers that be above Ronnie Franchise want to make a bigger and sooner splash, aka a Sam Reinhart, Jake Guentzel, or a big trade (Marner, etc.). That 8th overall pick could pull in immediate help for next season. Can’t wait to see!
I would consider trading For Marner if he could be signed long term. Something like Burakovsky/Winterton/2nd. We get a substantial upgrade long term and they get an instant replacement for Marner as well as some good prospects and cap savings. Or even Burakovsky/Gourde, yanni could be a great fit in TO.
Agree with this sentiment. Just using the historical eyeball test, UFAs feel like they rarely improve after applying the ink to the contract. This article provides the numbers to prove that. UFAs are best as compliments to a core, so the Kraken need to focus on building up that core, which means players and prospects in their 20s.
It was always said in business that it is the third manager who gets to experience the success, based upon the tough decisions made by the first and second managers before him. I don’t see that being much different here, Francis will last another two seasons, to be replaced in time for someone else to come in and build off of what he has done. The third GM will be the Stanley Cup winner.
That’s not how it worked for Vegas.
How does player age factor in to the analysis? Are the players ages too varied to factor in trends related to age, or have any trends emerged at all?
Looking at the date there doesn’t seem to be a lot of impact on the cohort I isolated. Panarin, Duchene, and Tavares were the best performers after signing and are all 28 or under. On the other side, Taylor Hall and Kyle Okposo, the two biggest drops in performance after signing were both 28. To really get at age, it would probably require broadening the pool. I.e. not just 8%+ Cap hit players but maybe 5% or something like that. There has got to be more risk with older players but offset with shorter term.
Who are we even talking about? With the cap at $88m the “big free agents” would be at $7.04m+. It doesn’t sound like Reinhardt or Stamkos are actually going to be available. Maybe the same on Marchessault. So who does that leave? Are we just talking about Guentzel and Lindholm?
Pass.
And Laine just requested a trade about the time this article published. Could be an interesting winger fit for Seattle. Not sure if he’s out of the PA program or not yet.
As noted filling a team need even if personal production dips is still valuable, I guess you’d need a wider comparison to compare if UFAs at other cap brackets performed more consistently pre & post signing and thus represent better value.
Whilst I wouldn’t jump to pay for a top forward yet, I would consider investing in a top blue liner. We’ve less talent coming through the system and it takes longer for them to hit their prime. Additionally the regression tends to be slower meaning the ROI of the contract tends to hold better too, particularly looking at defensive defencemen.
For all these reasons I am in favour of us paying for a Top4 Dman aged 28-30 to help anchor the blue line for 5 or 6 years. Without being a big point getter they should probably still come under the 8% cap hit too. Pesce would be my preference if it were possible to wish these things into being.
I appreciate the immediate need is goal scoring and so management may not go this route. But I feel it’d be the better long term approach. It looks like a number of top4 D might hit the market, and that supply should help keep prices down, and with a few contracts set to expire next summer and another cap increase likely we would have a lot more flexibility to add a real goal threat next Summer.
The other side is when players sign for 5mill for 3 years because you think the numbers will improve. We have 7 or 8 like that. Those numbers make it difficult to move them as well. Is there not a way to add a bonus that when u pay a player 4 mill and they improve, you can give them another mil? Once a player signs for 3 years, they seem too not care as much until the 3rd year again. Kraken have many of those type of players. You can never may them less if the underperform but you should not pay them more if they underperform.
Performance bonuses are only allowed for entry-level contracts and one-year deals for players who are either 35+ years old or who have played at least 400 career games and spent at least 100 days on IR in the last year of their previous contract.
The best way to improve quickly is via trades. Pair a prospect or two with a veteran to someone with some term. Signing 28yo+ FAs seldom works out in any sport IMO so trying get guys with a few years left on their 2nd contract seems best. Something to note is that it seems very likely the NBA is coming back here soon and will definitely take ticket $ away from the Kraken so there’s added pressure there. Having a non-playoff team for a sport that is already 4th or 5th on people’s list of favorite leagues will have stiff competition against the return of a franchise that has been missed. If the Kraken don’t compile some winning teams for the next 2 seasons it’ll be trouble I think. On the plus side the ticket prices will come down lol! Anyways, Ron is in a tight spot and his last off-season moves were a big miss but he doesn’t seem like a big gambler so My guess is he’ll target someone like Debrusk.
Agree that trades are the only way for quick improvement, unless the team gets lucky and one of their prospects pops unexpectedly. DeBrusk is certainly a RF style move but other names in the trade rumor mill include Laine and Nečas. If RF plays according to the Carolina script, he may not last so much longer.
I wonder how this data would compare to big free agent contracts where they were re-signed by their original team? I would guess part of the regression shown here was often expected and that’s why they were allowed to walk.
If that is true, finding free agents where the original team clearly tried hard to retain the player would make sense.
This seems like an extremely limited way of defining whether a signing “worked out.” Don’t most aging curve studies (at least, public ones) indicate that players peak around 24-25? Any signing for a UFA-aged player, regardless of team, player quality, or contract, should therefore be expected to fail according to this analysis.
I still lean no on the question of whether to go for the biggest free agent signing(s) possible, but I don’t find these numbers particularly convincing as presented.
That’s a very good point but doesn’t change the basic premise regarding signing UFA. Sure many UFA become available during their prime and the competition for their services often ends up being long contracts for top dollar. Regardless if others regress at the same rate it still points out that it might not be in teams best interest to invest heavily at that point. It’s obviously situation based and there teams that need a little extra to take a cup run…. We’re not in that situation right now and a big investment might not be in our best interest.
I just don’t understand why the same premise wouldn’t apply to extending your own players or trading for them as well. For instance, do we really think Marner’s point production would improve if the Kraken were to trade for him? He’s 27 and coming from a team with substantially more talent. Does that mean that such a move is inherently a failure, regardless of the cost? Whether these players still performed reasonably well relative to their contract isn’t addressed in the analysis.
Again, I’m not trying to argue that going big in free agency is advisable this year, just that “on average their production decreases” sounds a lot more like an argument against rostering anyone over age 25 than an argument specifically against signing higher-cost UFAs.
I also can’t help noticing that of the five highest AAV skater contracts, three (Panarin, Tavares, Hamilton) are among the few players whose production did increase, one (Pietrangelo) had a relatively minor decrease, and the fifth is Johnny Gaudreau. Which could indicate that the very highest tier of UFAs are actually decent bets, but those players aren’t available every year and might not be inclined to sign with Seattle. Of course, 5 players in 14 years is not a real sample so it could also be completely meaningless.
The Kraken franchise is currently in a precarious, almost desperate situation. NBA expansion is on the horizon and the Sonics could re-appear as early as the 2026/27 season. While I personally think the NBA has devolved into a repulsive, narcissistic personality cult, there’s no doubt once the Sonics arrive and given the NBAs attendant popularity Kraken will clearly become second fiddle. IF the team continues to perform at last year’s level, attendance could easily decline to 9,000-10,000 per game, the death knell for a team (like many NHL teams) that rely primarily on gate receipts for its’ survival. At that point the team could morph into the next iteration of the Houston Aeros. I’ve followed/supported hockey in Seattle my entire life (hence the moniker) but for whatever reason Seattle has never really struck me as a true hockey town.
Given the above, the Kraken are under tremendous pressure to significantly improve the team this offseason. I understand the thought that most FAs signed underperform their new ginormous contracts, but circumstances described above have backed this franchise into a corner. RF will have to step out beyond his plodding, methodical character and (for him) become aggressive to the point of discomfort this offseason. That is why I suggested in another post that the team should buy out player contracts (Burakovsky, Schwartz et al) to create cap space for this offseason. The team will need to re-work/upgrade the roster this offseason. It is imperative the Kraken elevate their performance for the next several seasons (think of the 2022/23 version as the floor going forward). Failure to do so will threaten the Kraken’s viability in Seattle. Let’s hope that RF is up to the task. The future of hockey in Seattle may depend on it.
I don’t think Kraken ownership is this shortsighted.
They are actually the ones bringing in the basketball team.
Yes I get that and I was being a bit hyperbolic, but without immediate success the team could end up with (as I described) with declining attendance and significant operating deficits, with ownership unwilling to subsidize eight-figure operating deficits on an ongoing basis. Leading to lower payroll and a non-competitive team. To paint the picture, think of the Mariners during the George Argyros/Jeff Smulyan years – low payrolls, crappy on the field product, declining attendance. Leading to operating deficits, lower payrolls etc. etc. etc. A franchise impaired and trapped in mediocrity.
We may have played against each other back in the day, assuming you played here and not just supported.
I completely agree with what you have said but the bigger problem, beyond Francis, is there are like 30 other teams out there with exactly the same mindset and a limited number of difference makers available, either as UFAs (a few) or via trade (fewer).
I think the Kraken need some star power to retain fans and the only way to ensure that is to hope one of the prospects pops. I really think they would have an easier time marketing the roster if it was full of future stars than 30ish, made-of-glass retreads. Some have said they only want to see Evans and Wright on the opening night roster. I think that is wrong, they need to have Evans, Wright, Winterton, Morrison, and Ottavainen on the roster. If they sign no UFAs or Yamamoto, there is room for them all.
If Francis needs to do something big, then that is buy-out or trade Grubauer and sign Dreidger. Any number of teams in the top 12 of the upcoming draft are shopping their picks. Francis needs to be all over that, trying to get a second top 12 first round pick, as the Kraken could use another high end offensive talent to go along with the top D they will draft at number 8. Doubt any of it will happen because it is Francis, so continued mediocrity here we come.
ChuckHolmes
No, sadly we didn’t play against each other. I went to 30-40 games per year as a kid (my dad was a medical professional associated with the team; he was required to attend every game). My biggest regret is that I didn’t take up hockey in my youth, I only started playing at age 50 in California.
In terms of buyout, I didn’t even think of Grubauer – he would be (one of) the obvious choices for this. As you’ve pointed out, they NEED more star power and NEED to hit big on at least 1-2 players in FA, and fill in with a couple of younger plays you named above.
Also agree that they need to spend capital (players and or draft picks to acquire another first rounder. If they play it right in the next couple months they can acquire talent for next year’s team AND add exciting players to their prospect pool.
It all depends on Ron…
Interesting article. It’s important to remember hockey is a team sport, and even if an individual’s production falls off, it doesn’t mean they aren’t helping the overall performance of a team. How many examples are there of teams signing UFA’s and making the Stanley Cup Playoffs within three years? Maybe that UFA is helping other players be productive, or helping the team improve defensively. I once heard John Cooper say “preventing a goal is the same thing as scoring a goal.”
Going to answer my own question. There aren’t any teams that made the Stanley Cup Final and didn’t sign UFA’s within three years of doing so. Not in “modern hockey”, anyway.